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ABSTRACT
We investigate adblocking lters and the extent to which
websites and advertisers react when their content is impacted
by these lters. We collected data daily from the Alexa Top-
5000 web sites for 120 days, and from specic sites that newly
appeared in lter lists for 140 days. By evaluating how long
a lter rule triggers on a website, we can gauge how long it
remains eective. We matched websites with both a regular
adblocking lter list (EasyList) and with a specialized lter
list that targets anti-adblocking logic (Nano Defender). From
our data, we observe that the eectiveness of the EasyList
adblocking lter decays a modest 0.13% per day, and after
around 80 days seems to stabilize. We found no evidence for
any signicant decay in eectiveness of the more specialized,
but less widely used, anti-adblocking removal lters.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Networks→Networkmeasurement; •Cross-computing
tools and techniques→Measurement;
KEYWORDS
Adblocking, anti-adblocking, web crawling.
1 INTRODUCTION
Internet advertising is a signicant source of income for
many web sites as well as for apps on mobile platforms. On
the other hand, advertisements are not desired by many users.
Ads consume bandwidth and battery power, and are a source
of attacks, such as malvertisements and social engineering
hacks (e.g., “viruses found on your system!”). Adblockers
help users block this unwanted content. Early adblockers
were simple DNS blacklists. Modern adblockers follow a
standardized syntax to specify patterns in hostnames as well
as digging deeper into the DOM structure of a website to
remove specic elements (see Section 2.2). A standardized
syntax allows anyone to create lter rules. These rules can
be generic to any web site while others are site-specic or
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even country-specic. EasyList and other organizations cen-
trally publish lists of these rules, which can be imported by
a variety of dierent ad-blocking extensions supported by
most modern web browsers.
Such lists threaten advertising and the accompanying rev-
enue. Unsurprisingly, both advertisers and their hosting
websites have found a variety of ways to push back. Recent
anti-adblocking technologies allow websites to detect the
presence of adblocking systems and change their behavior
accordingly. Websites can then request the user to disable
their adblocker, or simply block the detected adblock-using
visitor. This has the makings of an “adblock war”: users are
blocking ads, and websites are blocking users. A new adver-
tisement may initially bypass the lters, which will cause
the lter lists to be updated and block the ad. . .which may
cause the advertiser to update its code to defeat the blocking.
In this paper, we investigate whether lter lists and ad-
vertisers respond to each other in such a fashion. For three
months, we continuously monitored lter lists and the web-
sites aected by them, adding new websites as lter lists
expanded. For each rule in a list, we tracked when it aected
the corresponding website. We looked at the aggregated data
to see if there was an overall trend, that is, how long it took
for advertisers to react to a new blocking rule, and how long
it took for lter rules to react to updated advertisements.
We will look at two separate lter lists: EasyList1, which
is widely used and enabled by default in many browser ad-
blocking plugins, and Nano Defender2, which is much less
popular but specically targets web page logic that attempts
to defeat ad-blocking.
Contributions and limitations: When we began this work,
no other study had used daily scans of large numbers of web-
sites to analyze adblocking. Now, several other researchers
have conducted studies in this area (discussed in Section 2.1),
but with dierent methodologies.
Our study has several limitations. First, we use lter lists
respecting the standard “Adblock Plus” syntax. We do not
1https://EasyList.to/
2https://jspenguin2017.github.io/uBlockProtector/
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measure other adblocking or privacy-enhancing techniques,
such as behaviors of or responses to browser extensions such
as Ghostery or NoScript. Moreover, our study’s results are
conned to the capabilities of the Adblock Plus engine and
the coverage of the monitored lists: any advertisement not
blockable by the engine, or not in any of the lists, is not
considered. Lastly, there are several possible sources of noise
in our data. Some of these are internal and known, such
as failure to connect to a website on a specic day. There
may also be external factors, such as a website switching ad
providers.
2 BACKGROUND INFORMATION
2.1 Related work
Many studies have analyzed online advertising and adblock-
ing. Some examined overall adblock usage and/or sentiment,
either by surveying users [3, 12] or analyzing aggregate
user data [11, 19]. Others have looked at the eectiveness
of adblocking as a privacy tool (e.g., [1, 5, 23, 25]). A few
have also examined topics such as browsing “quality of ex-
perience” [16] and performance [6]. Several studies took
a more direct approach to detecting ads, such as automati-
cally sourcing adblocker lter rules [8], detecting ad-blockers
through inspecting network trac [13], foiling ad-blocker
detection [2], and perceptually detecting ads [21, 22]).
The overarching adblock vs. advertiser arms race has also
been studied. Storey et al. [20] characterize three stages in
the arms race: rst, adblocking by users versus ad obfusca-
tion by advertisers; second, adblock detection by advertisers
versus obfuscated adblocking by users; and last, blocking
adblock detectors by users versus obfuscated adblock detec-
tors by advertisers. Gritckevich et al. [7] examine adblockers
from a game theory perspective, developing a model to exam-
ine how adblockers aect users and ad publishers. Mughees
et al. [14, 15] use automated A/B testing to determine the
incidence of anti-adblocking techniques on the web. They
scanned the Alexa Top 100K and found at least 0.7% of sites
use adblock-detection techniques, asking their users to turn
o adblocking once detected. Nithyanand et al. [17] study
the prevalence of adblock detection techniques by focusing
on third-party services in the Alexa Top 5K websites, nding
that at least 6.7% of the sites in their sample used adblock de-
tection techniques. Zhu et al. [26] created an “anti-adblock”
detection approach. They automatically visit targeted sites
multiple times with and without adblocking and analyze the
dierences in the execution time. They found that 30.5% of
the Alexa Top 5K used some form of anti-adblocking code.
Parts of the work by Iqbal et al. [9] resemble our study.
In 2017 they set out to determine how adblock detection
evolved. They approach this by using the Internet Archive
to retrieve previous versions of websites and match them
against a lter list. Our study uses similar adblock detection,
but we collected live data directly, not archived data via a
third party. In 2018, they published a followup study [10]
looking at multiple layers of the web stack (HTML, HTTP,
Javascript), building a supervised machine learning model
to block ads and trackers.
A recent tech report by Vastel et al. [24] independently
uses a similar approach to ours. They also analyzed Ea-
syList’s performance on Alexa top sites in order to better
understand lter lists. While doing so, they posed several of
the same questions we do in this paper and used a number
of methods that were similar to our own, albeit relying on a
substantially dierent implementation approach. Our work
on this area diers in two key ways from the work by Vastel
et al. First, we examined more lter lists than just EasyList.
Second, we use dierent statistical methods to summarize
our data.
2.2 How adblocking works
Adblocking lters have rules expressed in a simple syntax3.
Rules can simply specify a URL or domain name, with or
without wildcards, which will prevent undesired elements
from even being loaded. Rules can also specify DOM el-
ements by ID or class, or by any of a variety of features,
including a path through the DOM tree, or styling attributes
like width and height. Such advertising elements will be re-
moved from the DOM even if they’re added dynamically by
JavaScript behaviors. Because these rules have the potential
to be too broad, exception rules are supported, where an
exception will override a blocking rule.
Anti-adblocking techniques generally work by introduc-
ing “bait” elements into the DOM that would be removed by
an adblocker. By using JavaScript to inspect the DOM, any
missing bait elements imply the presence of an adblocker.
The site can then take additional actions, such as request-
ing the user to disable their adblocker. Bait elements can
be avoided using exception rules. Alternatively, anti-anti-
adblocking rules can directly target the JavaScript used by
the anti-adblockers. EasyList has a specic policy with re-
gard to anti-adblocking rules: “Anti-Adblock should only
be challenged if the system limits website functionality or
causes signicant disruption to browsing”4, whereas Nano
Defender has no such limitations.
3 METHODOLOGY
The goal of our experiment is to determine if and to what
extent websites respond to adblock updates and adblock-
ers respond to website updates. A meaningful answer to
this question must be based on data collected from many
3https://adblockplus.org/lters
4https://easylist.to/pages/policy.html
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websites and lter rulesets taken over time. Therefore, our
methodology is described in two parts: data collection and
data analysis.
3.1 Data collection
We collected two main types of data: daily iterations of
the EasyList and Nano Defender (and predecessors) lter
lists and daily scrapes of various targeted websites. For
the lter lists, all the relevant les and commit histories
are available on either GitHub or the AdblockPlus team’s
Mercurial repository5. We iterated through every commit in
the project histories for every particular lter list and then
downloaded the nal revision on every day there was at least
one commit.
We note that Nano Defender eectively is a fork of an ear-
lier project called Anti-Adblock Killer, apparently abandoned
by its author in 2016. The Anti-Adblock Killer rules, inher-
ited by Nano Defender, appear as a single large commit in
the Nano Defender ruleset. As these rules are all signicantly
older than the time period of our web scraping activities we
ignored them when looking specically at the day-by-day
impact of a given rule on our corpus of web scrapes.
Our approach to scraping websites diers from most stud-
ies discussed in Section 2.1. Generally speaking, most studies
used Selenium to drive browsers running on local machines.
Although doing so is highly eective for doing one-o jobs,
we were performing daily scrapes on a large number of
websites for months on end. We used the Scrapinghub cloud
platform6. Using their open-source Scrapy (congurable web
scraper) and Splash (headless browser) libraries, we were
able to easily scrape thousands of websites per day using
one Scrapy cloud unit and a small Splash instance (which
respectively cost $9 and $25 USD per month).
At every website we visited, we rst scrolled to the bottom
and waited 1.5 seconds, to allow for delayed behaviors. We
saved a copy of the page’s DOM at this point as well as its
HTTP Archive (HAR)7 for subsequent processing. During
an approximately 140 day timespan, we collected roughly
487 GB of total data: close to 400 GB from the Alexa websites
(collected during 120 days) and the remainder from websites
specically targeted by lter rules in Nano Defender list
(collected during 140 days).
We scraped the Alexa Top 5K on a daily basis for 120 days,
as well as websites targeted by the Anti-Adblock Killer and
Nano Defender lter lists for 140 days. We used a Rake task8
that downloads any commits to the two lter lists on a daily
basis and extracts the URLs from newly added rules. This
ensures a short turnaround time between addition of a new
5https://hg.adblockplus.org
6https://scrapinghub.com/platform
7http://www.softwareishard.com/blog/har-12-spec/
8https://github.com/ruby/rake
lter rule for a new website, and that site’s inclusion in our
scraper.
Our entire data collection process ran roughly from April
through August in 2017 with a variety of false-starts and
engineering challenges beforehand to get it running.
3.2 Data processing and analysis
For each web site image scraped, and for each set of lter
rules against which we need to evaluate it, we used the open
source Libadblockplus library9 to determine whether that
day’s lter list would “trigger” on the downloaded version of
a website for that day. We specically chose Libadblockplus
because it is a C++ wrapper around the Javascript Adblock
Plus core engine, reducing the likelihood of its behavior
diering from in-browser adblocking. Libadblockplus, when
given the result of the web scraper and a lter list, returns a
list of matched web page elements with their corresponding
matched rules. An exception rule that also matches the same
web page element will suppress that web page element from
the list of results.
Recall that EasyList and Nano Defender use exception
rules in dierent ways. EasyList uses exceptions to nar-
row otherwise overbroad positive rules, avoiding undesired
damage to a web page. Nano Defender, on the other hand,
uses exceptions to avoid touching bait elements used by
anti-adblocking logic. As such, we invert the sense of Nano
Defender’s exception rules; if a Nano Defender exception
rule triggers on a web page element, we consider that to
be a successful match, because it’s operating to defeat an
anti-adblocker.
Due to the size of our data set, we split these jobs into
smaller chunks (generally 250 websites at a time) which we
ran in parallel on our institutional cluster. This enabled us
to process months of scrape data using canonical versions
of the various lter lists in a handful of days. We saved the
results of these compute jobs as simple JSON les, in which
we mapped websites to lists of (lter rule, oending resource)
pairs for each day of scraped data.
We plotted these results (see e.g., Figure 1) with the time
since the rule’s introduction on the horizontal axis and col-
lected data on the vertical axis. Specically, each row corre-
sponds to one (website, lter-rule) tuple. For a given day x
and a given tupley (website, lter-rule), the value of the point
(x ,y) in the graph is either true, false, or fail, and colored as
follows:
• Black: true—the archived copy for day x of the web-
site triggered a hit on the lter rule.
• White: false—the archived copy for day x did not
trigger a hit.
• Gray: fail—no data available.
9https://github.com/adblockplus/libadblockplus
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In our graphs and data processing, rows with lter rules
that never triggered on those sites are omitted. As such, for
each combination of a website and a lter rule that triggered
at least once on that website, we ended up with a row of
data in our graphs. Failures may be due to failure to contact
the website, but also occur when the day is outside the ob-
servation window of the website. We discuss this further,
below.
Our graphing technique is designed to align each row
based on the date at which the rule was introduced. Each
value of (x , (ysite,yrule)) shows whether lter rule yrule still
triggered on the copy of website ysite after x days.
To clarify this alignment process, consider Figure 1, where
there are two gray “triangles” of missing data. The data rows
adjacent to the lower-left triangle correspond to cases where
the rule predates the start of our experiment. So if a rule was
80 days old at the start of the experiment, then we would only
render results for x = 80→ 120. The data rows adjacent to
the upper-right triangle correspond to cases where the rule
appeared while our experiment was ongoing. So, if a rule
appeared on day 80, we would only have 40 days of results
for the eectiveness of that rule, appearing at x = 0→ 40.
A consequence of this alignment process is that vertical
slices through the graph contain all the ltering eectiveness
data we have for rules of a given age.
3.3 Statistical Methods
Plotting the data as described above allows us to gauge the
eectiveness of lter list rules over time. Specically, we
use the ratio of total number of hits for a given day x versus
the total number of hits + misses as an approximation of
the overall eectiveness of lter list rules after x days. We
would expect this ratio to decline as websites take measures
to reduce the eectiveness of lter rules.
Note that collapsing an entire column into a single value
misses out on sources of uncertainty hidden in the value. The
process of scraping websites includes a number of sources
of noise. Principal amongst these is that the number of lter
rules for which we do not have data varies from day to day.
For example, in Figure 3, there is little data available after
40 days, and scant after 80. Thus, it is essential to model the
uncertainty in our data.
To get meaningful error bars for our graphs, we cannot
simply take the standard deviation of a sequence of 1’s and
0’s. Instead, we use bootstrap resampling (see, e.g., [18]), a
standard technique for computing many common statistics.
In our case, we compute the 95% condence interval over
the mean. Bootstrap resampling produces a robust result
without requiring the data to be normally distributed [4].
Bootstrap resampling in a nutshell: Bootstrap resam-
pling is a statistical measure that relies on sampling with
replacement. Consider a data set with n elements over which
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Figure 1: EasyList eectiveness on Alexa Top 5K (raw
data, rasterized)
Figure 2: EasyList eectiveness on Alexa Top 5K (av-
erage with condence intervals)
the average is computed. To determine the condence inter-
vals, we rst randomly sample (with replacement) n values
from the data set. We compute the average of this sample. We
then repeat this sampling process 5,000 times, yielding 5,000
so-called “resampled averages”. These are then sorted from
small to large. The 2.5th percentile and the 97.5th percentile
of this list then provide us with bounds on the condence in-
terval. This corresponds to a 95% condence interval around
the average. We then can render these condence intervals
as error bars on our graphs.
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4 ANALYSIS
We rst consider the popular EasyList lter and next look at
the more targeted Nano Defender lters. We also consider
how our data can conrm results from prior studies.
4.1 EasyList
Our analysis of the eectiveness of EasyList lter rules showed
two discontinuous sections (see Figure 2). This is due to the
denominator changing signicantly after x = 75, which is
an artifact of our methodology. As can be seen in Figure 1,
we have signicantly more data for the rst 75 days of lter
rules existence than for the latter 45 days. This is because
EasyList added a large number of lter rules for new web-
sites on day 45 of our experiment. Since we could monitor
the performance of these rules from their introduction, these
are all plotted from x = 0 in Figure 1.
In Figure 2, the rst section depicts a long period in which
large number of EasyList’s lter rules show declining eec-
tiveness. A simple linear best t of this section (plotted as
a straight line on the graph) shows a decrease of just over
0.13% per day, with a total loss of roughly 10% in about 75
days. These results exclude EasyList’s “exception rules” (see
Section 2.2). Taking these rules into account, we see a the
decrease of roughly 0.2% per day on average, with a total
loss of roughly 15% in the same period of time. (Visually, the
resulting graphs appear similar to Figure 2 and are omitted
for space.) The obvious explanation is that websites and
advertisers do indeed respond to the introduction of new
EasyList lter rules.
Following the discontinuity at approximately day 75 we
observe no signicant decline; attempting to plot a linear
best t as we did in the prior section of the graph results in a
horizontal line. This suggests the underlying process of web-
site operators and advertisers responding to EasyList is not
a linear process. A longer time period of data collection over
many more websites might well show a t to an exponential
curve.
4.2 Nano Defender
We next examine the eectiveness of the more targeted anti-
adblock lter rules in the Nano Defender lter list. In ad-
dition to the Alexa Top 5K (see Figure 3) we also looked at
websites outside this list that were specically targeted by
Nano Defender (see Figure 5).
Figure 4 shows that initially the lter eectiveness rate
is approximated by a horizontal line. The upward trend in
the averages is overwhelmed by the growing condence
intervals. Our best interpretation is that there is no evidence
of a decay in Nano Defender’s lter rule eectiveness over
time.
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Figure 3: Nano Defender eectiveness on the Alexa
Top 5K (raw data)
Figure 4: Nano Defender eectiveness on the Alexa
Top 5K (average with condence intervals)
From roughly x = 45 on, we no longer have sucient
data. This is clearly illustrated in the increasing size of the
condence intervals, and also apparent in Figure 3. Notwith-
standing this lack of data for later days, the absence of a
downward trend in the rst part of Figure 4 is signicant,
and thus we conclude that in general, websites are currently
neither tracking nor responding to updates in the Nano De-
fender lter rules.
A curious possibility is that the absence of observed l-
ter eectiveness decay in the Nano Defender data, versus
the presence of decay in the EasyList data, controls for the
possibility that web sites are simply drifting over time in
their engineering practices. If that were the cause of our
5
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Figure 5: Nano Defender eectiveness on websites tar-
geted by Nano Defender
observed lter eectiveness decay, then we should see a
similar eect in both data sets. Contrarily, the engineering
of Nano Defender is much more specically targeted than
the engineering of EasyList, so it’s also possible that a “drift
eect” would impact EasyList’s eectiveness more than it
impacts Nano Defender.
4.3 Comparing results with prior studies
Iqbal et al. [9] also looked at subsections of EasyList and Anti-
Adblock Killer (their work predates the Nano Defender list).
They found, for the Alexa Top 5K websites, that Nano trig-
gered on 8.7% websites and that AdblockWarningRemoval-
List combined with the anti-adblock sections of EasyList
(hereafter “AWRL/EasyList” ) only triggered on 0.4% web-
sites. Nithyanand et al. [17] similarly found anti-adblocking
logic on 6.7% of the Alexa Top 5K.
To compare their results with our data, where we have
multiple samples of each lter lists and of each website, we
restate their question as follows: Do any versions of Nano
Defender list or AWRL/EasyList trigger on any versions of
each given website? We nd that the combined Nano De-
fender list triggered on roughly 13.3% of the Alexa Top 5K
(exactly 666 unique websites) and that AWRL/EasyList trig-
gered on 0.06% of the Alexa Top 5K (exactly 3 websites).
Our observed growth in anti-adblocking logic relative to
Iqbal’s results likely combines two eects: a genuine in-
crease in websites using such logic, as well as increased
engineering eorts on the part of Nano Defender to detect
and lter such logic. AWRL/EasyList has remained compar-
atively static with fairly few commits in the same period
of time; websites and advertisers have clearly engineered
around AWRL/EasyList.
We next focus on PageFair, a commercial service that
provides websites with adblocking analytics and adblock-
resistant advertising. Nithyanand et al. [17] looked at a
number of such services, nding 20 web sites using PageFair,
which was then successfully blocked by AdBlockPlus and
Privacy Badger, but not Ghostery. We detected 67 separate
websites in the Alexa Top 5K using PageFair, all of which are
successfully ltered by the Nano Defender list.
Nithyanand also discussed the arms race of websites de-
tecting and responding to adblockers. They noted that ad-
block detection scripts are often loaded from popular content
distribution networks such as Cloudare. One prominent
such project is “BlockAdblock”. This project appears to have
been available from Cloudare since at least August 2015. We
detected 20 websites in the Alexa Top 5K using some variant
of BlockAdblock. Surprisingly, we detected only one of these
websites using the suggested Cloudare CDN URL; 8 of the
remaining 19 used a URL owned by an advertising company,
another 10 chose to serve a copy of the script themselves,
and one website used a dierent CDN service.
5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
We observed an approximate 0.13% decrease per day in the
eectiveness on the Alexa Top 5000 web sites of new rules
in the EasyList lter list in the immediate period after they
were added. However, websites did not appear to be actively
responding to updates in the more specialized and less widely
used Nano Defender list.
There are numerous opportunities for additional work in
this area. For example, scaling up our methodology to run
on millions rather than thousands of web sites, and for longer
periods of time, would certainly be feasible and interesting.
Using Scrapinghub, scaling the data collection is straightfor-
ward, albeit more expensive. Analyzing larger volumes of
collected data would certainly require larger computing clus-
ters, which require an additional expense to rent. At least
the process is straightforward to distribute on a cluster, since
each web site scrape, evaluated against each lter ruleset, is
a completely independent task.
Another interesting possibility would be to cluster the var-
ious anti-adblocking mechanisms that a longer-term survey
might discover over time, to understand the diversity of the
anti-adblocking ecosystem.
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